FICOBA
A national bank-account file reached through a compromised high-trust credential — one official's login, with access granted for information exchange between ministries. (Source: DGFiP statement)
In finance, the breach almost never starts with the core banking system. It starts with a credential that could reach it: a vendor's, a contractor's, or an employee's that outlived the job. The three incidents below share that shape.
A national bank-account file reached through a compromised high-trust credential — one official's login, with access granted for information exchange between ministries. (Source: DGFiP statement)
Customer and staff data accessed in a database hosted by a third-party provider. (Source: Santander statement)
The common failure: over-permissioned roles and access that never expires, so one compromised credential becomes a systemic problem rather than a contained one.
Your core systems are examined constantly. The access paths into them are not. The question is not whether your mainframe is hardened; it is who can reach it from outside, through what, and whether anyone would notice at 2am.
If any answer is "no" or "I would have to ask", that is the blind spot.
The two-page PDF adds the full account of each incident and the control that would have stopped it. Name and work email, and it comes straight back.
The sector page: identity security for financial services. The service that closes the gap: PAM implementation. And a free audit is 30 minutes with a certified engineer on your own environment, findings in writing: Get a free audit.
Name and work email. The two-page PDF covers each incident in full and the control that would have stopped it.
Needed for the site to work — page delivery, and the spam protection on our forms. These do not track you and cannot be switched off.
Google Analytics and Microsoft Clarity, so we can see which pages are useful and which are confusing. Clarity hides anything you type into a form. We use this to improve the site, not to identify you.
ZoomInfo WebSights, which tells us which organisation a visit is likely to have come from and which pages were read. With this on, ZoomInfo may also set third-party cookies that help it recognise a visit across other websites, and may share that with its own partners. Turning this off stops all of it.